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Abstract	  
	  
The	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  asserts	  that	  money	  should	  be	  issued	  in	  exchange	  for	  short-­‐term	  
real	  bills	  of	  adequate	  value.	  Critics	  of	  this	  doctrine	  have	  thought	  of	  it	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
make	  the	  money	  supply	  move	  in	  step	  with	  the	  production	  of	  goods,	  a	  task	  at	  which	  it	  
supposedly	  fails.	  In	  this	  essay	  I	  explain	  that	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  is	  actually	  a	  means	  to	  
make	  the	  money	  supply	  move	  in	  step	  with	  the	  money-­‐issuer’s	  assets.	  When	  viewed	  
this	  way,	  I	  find	  that	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  is	  an	  effective	  means	  to	  prevent	  inflation.	  
More	  importantly,	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  is	  a	  means	  to	  make	  the	  quantity	  of	  money	  
grow	  and	  shrink	  with	  the	  needs	  of	  business,	  thus	  preventing	  money	  shortages	  and	  the	  
resulting	  recessions.	  	  	  
Introduction	  
	  The	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  dates	  at	  least	  from	  1705,	  when	  John	  Law	  stated	  his	  version	  of	  it	  in	  Money	  and	  Trade	  Considered.	  James	  Steuart	  discussed	  it	  further	  in	  1767.	  Adam	  Smith	   restated	   it	   in	   1776.	   	   It	   was	   thought	   to	   have	   been	   buried	   by	   David	   Ricardo	  during	   the	   Bullionist	   debates	   of	   1810,	   only	   to	   rise	   again	   in	   the	   Currency	  School/Banking	   School	   debates	   of	   1845.	   It	   was	   incorporated	   into	   the	   Federal	  Reserve	   Act	   in	   1913.	   It	   has	   been	   blamed	   for	   the	   European	   hyperinflations	   of	   the	  1920’s	   and	   for	   the	   great	  Depression	  of	   the	  1930’s.	   	   Since	  being	   attacked	  by	  Lloyd	  Mints	   in	  1945,	   it	  has	  been	  regarded	  as	  discredited	  by	  mainstream	  economists,	  but	  nevertheless	  re-­‐appeared	  as	  the	  Fiscal	  Theory	  of	  the	  Price	  Level	  in	  1982.	  Writing	  in	  1992,	   Mark	   Blaug	   (p.	   54)	   declared	   it	   “high	   on	   the	   list	   of	   longest-­‐lived	   economic	  fallacies	  of	  all	  times”.	  	  In	  this	  essay	  I	  hope	  to	  show	  that	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  is	  not	  a	  fallacy,	  and	  that	  the	  reason	  for	  its	  longevity	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  correct	  theory	  that	  has	  been	  wrongly	  rejected	  by	  economists.	  Like	  any	  theory	  that	  has	  existed	  for	  centuries,	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  has	  been	  stated	  and	  misstated	  in	  many	  different	  ways,	  so	  the	  first	  order	  of	  business	  is	   to	   try	   to	   state	   the	   real	   bills	   doctrine	  with	   reasonable	   accuracy	   and	   clarity.	   This	  requires	  a	  brief	  survey	  of	  various	  statements	  of	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  that	  have	  been	  made,	  both	  by	  its	  advocates	  and	  its	  opponents.	  	  
The	  Real	  Bills	  Doctrine	  as	  Stated	  by	  Two	  of	  its	  Advocates…	  
	  
…so long as a bank issues its notes only in the discount of 
good bills, at not more than 60 days’ date, it cannot go 
wrong in issuing as many as the public will receive from it 
(Fullarton, 1845, p. 198). 
 
Bank notes, based on the security of such commercial 
assets, are an elastic as well as a safe form of credit 
operations; because salable goods, in the process of 
getting from producer to consumer, are the final recourse 
over and beyond all securities — since collateral is, after 
all, only a title to salable property or goods. (Laughlin, 
1903, p. 89) 	  
…And	  by	  Two	  of	  its	  Opponents	  
	  
If banks restrict their loans to self-liquidating 
commercial paper, that is, to discounting short-term notes 
based on goods in process, the means of payment in an 
economy will necessarily expand in pace with the volume of 
goods produced. (Blaug, 1992, p. 202) 
 
Briefly, those who have defended this position have held 
that, if only "real" bills are discounted, the expansion of 
bank money will be in proportion to any extension in trade 
that may take place, or to the "needs of trade," and that, 
when trade contracts, bank loans will be correspondingly 
paid off. (Mints, 1945, p. 9.) 
 With	   these	  various	  versions	  of	   the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	   in	  mind,	   I	  offer	  my	  own	  best	  attempt	  at	  a	  coherent	  statement	  of	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine:	  	  
Money	  should	  be	  issued	  in	  exchange	  for	  short-­‐term	  real	  bills	  of	  adequate	  value.	  	  In	   this	   statement,	  money	   is	   usually	   understood	   to	  mean	   bank	   notes,	   but	   real	   bills	  principles	  apply	   just	  as	  well	  to	  checking	  account	  money	  or	  credit	  card	  money.	  The	  
issuer	   of	   the	   money	   is	   usually	   understood	   to	   be	   a	   bank,	   but	   real	   bills	   principles	  would	  also	  apply	  to	  money	  issued	  by	  a	  government	  or	  private	  individual.	  Finally,	  the	  phrase	  should	  be	  issued	  is	  deliberately	  used	  to	  emphasize	  that	  money	  provides	  vital	  liquidity	   to	   the	  economy	  at	   large,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  a	  source	  of	  profit	   to	   the	   issuing	  bank.	  So	  as	  long	  as	  the	  public	  wants	  bank	  notes	  badly	  enough	  to	  hand	  over	  assets	  of	  equal	  or	  greater	  value	  to	  the	  issuing	  bank,	  the	  bank	  should	  issue	  those	  notes.	  	  	  Three	  items	  in	  my	  statement	  of	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  merit	  special	  attention:	  1)	  short	  term	  2)	  real	  bills	  3)	  of	  adequate	  value	  	  
Adequate	  Value	  
	  Item	   (3)	   is	   the	  most	   important	   of	   the	   three.	   	   A	   bank	   that	   issues	   $100	  of	   its	   notes	  must	  receive	  assets	  worth	  at	  least	  $100	  in	  exchange.	  A	  bank	  that	  gets	  assets	  worth	  only	  $99	  will	   see	   its	  net	  worth	  drop	  by	  $1,	  and	  a	  bank	   that	  makes	  a	  habit	  of	   such	  trades	  risks	  insolvency,	  along	  with	  a	  resulting	  depreciation	  of	  its	  notes.	  Economists	  who	   are	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   Free	   Banking	   school	   of	   thought	   will	   notice	   that	   the	  
bank’s	   best	   interest	   is	   served	   by	   obeying	   the	   adequate	   value	   rule.	   The	   real	   bills	  doctrine	  can	  therefore	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  guiding	  principle	  of	  Free	  Banking.	  	  The	  adequate	  value	  requirement	  is	  so	  obvious	  that	  a	  banker	  who	  needs	  reminding	  of	  it	   has	   no	   business	   being	   a	   banker.	   Accordingly,	   adequacy	   of	   value	   is	   rarely	  mentioned	   in	   statements	   of	   the	   real	   bills	   doctrine.	   It	   is,	   however,	   implicit	   in	   the	  statements	  of	  both	  Fullarton	  and	  Laughlin.	  Fullarton,	  for	  example,	  says	  notes	  should	  be	   issued	  only	   in	   the	  discount	  of	  good	  bills.	   That	   those	   bills	   should	   be	   of	   adequate	  value	   would	   be	   understood	   by	   an	   alert	   reader,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   made	   explicit	   in	   the	  statement.	   Laughlin,	   in	   contrast,	   speaks	   explicitly	   of	   salable	   goods	   serving	   as	  collateral	  for	  bank	  notes.	  	  A	   reasonable	   inference	   to	   draw	   from	   the	   statements	   of	   Fullarton	   and	   Laughlin	   is	  that	   the	  adequate	  value	   requirement	   automatically	  makes	   the	   issuing	  bank’s	  assets	  move	  in	  step	  with	  its	  money	  issue,	  thus	  preserving	  the	  money’s	  value.	  Every	  issue	  of	  $100	  of	  notes	  is	  matched	  by	  at	  least	  $100	  of	  good	  bills	  received	  by	  the	  bank	  as	  new	  assets.	  If	  the	  bank	  fails	  to	  get	  or	  maintain	  assets	  of	  adequate	  value,	  then	  the	  bank’s	  issuance	  of	  money	  will	  outrun	  its	  assets	  and	  the	  bank’s	  money	  will	  lose	  value.	  	  A	  very	  different	  inference	  would	  be	  drawn	  from	  Blaug’s	  and	  Mints’	  statements	  of	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine:	  ”the	  means	  of	  payment	  in	  an	  economy	  will	  necessarily	  expand	  in	  pace	  with	  the	  volume	  of	  goods	  produced.”	  This	  is	  the	  key	  difference	  between	  the	  Laughlin/Fullarton	  statements	  and	  those	  of	  Blaug/Mints:	  The	  Laughlin/Fullarton	  statements	  imply	  that	  bank	  notes	  will	  hold	  their	  value	  if	  their	  quantity	  moves	  in	  step	  with	  the	  issuing	  bank’s	  assets	  (exactly	  like	  stocks,	  bonds,	  or	  any	  other	  financial	  securities),	  while	  the	  Blaug/Mints	  statements	  imply	  that	  bank	  notes	  will	  hold	  their	  value	  if	  their	  quantity	  moves	  in	  step	  with	  the	  volume	  of	  goods	  produced	  in	  the	  economy	  at	  large	  (unlike	  any	  other	  financial	  securities).	  	  Misunderstandings	  of	  this	  distinction	  have	  been	  a	  prolific	  source	  of	  confusion.	  For	  example,	  Henry	  Thornton	  (1802,	  p.	  86.)	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  same	  goods	  might	  be	  sold	  and	  resold	  six	  times	  in	  six	  months.	  Each	  purchaser	  might	  buy	  those	  goods	  by	  issuing	  a	  bill	  at	  six	  months	  credit,	  and	  note-­‐issuing	  banks	  might	  have	  issued	  bank	  notes	  in	  the	  process	  of	  discounting	  each	  of	  those	  bills.	  In	  this	  way,	  $600	  of	  new	  bank	  notes	  might	  have	  been	  issued,	  based	  upon	  only	  $100	  worth	  of	  goods.	  Thornton	  considered	  this	  a	  satisfactory	  proof	  that	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  allows	  note	  issue	  to	  outpace	  the	  volume	  of	  goods	  produced,	  and	  thus	  to	  cause	  inflation.	  He	  failed	  to	  see	  that	  banks	  would	  not	  discount	  a	  bill	  without	  getting	  adequate	  collateral.	  The	  $600	  of	  bank	  notes	  would	  only	  be	  issued	  if	  the	  bills	  were	  adequately	  backed	  by	  at	  least	  $600	  worth	  of	  collateral	  posted	  by	  the	  issuers	  of	  the	  bills.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  assures	  that	  the	  quantity	  of	  bank	  notes	  moves	  in	  step	  with	  the	  issuing	  
bank’s	  assets.	  The	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  therefore	  does	  prevent	  inflation.	  	  	  Similar	  errors	  were	  committed	  by	  David	  Ricardo	  (1810)	  and	  by	  Lloyd	  Mints	  (1945)	  (Sproul,	  1999).	  Both	  men	  demonstrated	  that	  even	  if	  banks	  faithfully	  followed	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine,	  their	  note	  issue	  could	  outpace	  the	  volume	  of	  goods	  
produced.	  Both	  men	  failed	  to	  see	  that	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  would	  preserve	  the	  value	  of	  money	  by	  preventing	  note	  issue	  from	  outpacing	  the	  issuing	  banks’	  assets.	  	  	  
Short	  Term	  	  Item	  (1),	  the	  requirement	  that	  bank	  notes	  should	  be	  issued	  in	  exchange	  for	  short-­‐
term	  assets,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  parts	  of	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  that	  is	  not	  controversial.	  Its	  obvious	  purpose	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  issuing	  bank	  from	  mismatching	  the	  maturities	  of	  its	  assets	  and	  its	  liabilities.	  Bank	  notes	  are	  traditionally	  payable	  on	  demand,	  though	  they	  are	  often	  protected	  by	  suspension	  clauses	  that	  allow	  the	  issuing	  bank,	  during	  bank	  panics,	  to	  delay	  payment	  by,	  say,	  60	  days.	  If	  that	  bank	  holds	  assets	  that	  are	  also	  payable	  within	  60	  days,	  then	  the	  bank	  will	  never	  face	  a	  liquidity	  crisis	  (assuming	  its	  assets	  are	  of	  adequate	  value).	  	  	  
Real	  Bills	  	  Item	  (2),	  that	  banks	  should	  issue	  notes	  in	  exchange	  for	  real	  bills,	  presents	  a	  puzzle.	  Why	  should	  a	  banker	  care	  whether	  he	  gets	  a	  farmer’s	  IOU	  (a	  “real	  bill”)	  or	  a	  gambler’s	  IOU	  (a	  “fictitious	  bill”),	  assuming	  both	  bills	  are	  equal	  in	  all	  other	  respects?	  If	  we	  think	  of	  the	  doctrine	  as	  stated	  above	  by	  Blaug/Mints,	  then	  the	  apparent	  purpose	  of	  the	  real	  bills	  requirement	  is	  to	  make	  the	  quantity	  of	  notes	  move	  in	  step	  with	  the	  volume	  of	  goods	  produced,	  thus	  avoiding	  inflation.	  But	  if	  we	  think	  of	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  as	  a	  rule	  to	  make	  note	  issue	  move	  in	  step	  with	  the	  issuing	  bank’s	  assets,	  then	  inflation	  avoidance	  is	  already	  accomplished	  by	  the	  adequate	  value	  requirement,	  and	  the	  real	  bills	  requirement	  seems	  to	  serve	  no	  purpose.	  	  Before	  we	  conclude	  that	  banks	  should	  not	  care	  if	  bills	  are	  real	  or	  not,	  we	  would	  do	  well	   to	  remember	  that	  the	  real	  bills	  doctrine	  was	  developed	  by	  practicing	  bankers	  over	  centuries	  of	  experience,	  and	   if	  parts	  of	   that	  doctrine	  served	  no	  purpose,	   then	  bankers	  would	  have	  abandoned	  them	  quickly	  enough.	  	  	  Testimony	   from	   the	   Directors	   of	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   makes	   it	   clear	   that	   their	  preference	  for	  discounting	  real	  bills	  centered	  around	  providing	  an	  elastic	  currency,	  that	  is,	  matching	  the	  quantity	  of	  money	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  business.	  	  	  
"What is the criterion which enables the Bank to keep the 
issue of bank-notes within the limit which the occasion of 
the public requires, and to guard against excess in the 
circulation of the country?"-  This question occurs 
virtually more than once, and the answer is this; 1st. The 
paper would revert to us, if there were a redundancy in 
circulation; 2dly. By discounting only solid paper, given, 
as far as we can judge, for real transactions. (Bosanquet, 
1810, p. 51) 	  When	  business	   is	   brisk,	   firms	  will	   be	   issuing	  many	   real	   bills,	   and	   the	   receivers	   of	  those	   bills	   will	   also	   be	   in	   need	   of	   bank-­‐issued	   money	   to	   conduct	   business	  
conveniently.	  Bill	  holders	  will	  naturally	  bring	  their	  real	  bills	  to	  bankers	  in	  the	  hope	  that	   the	   bankers	   will	   issue	   their	   notes	   in	   exchange	   for	   those	   bills.	   Bankers	   who	  discount	   only	   real	   bills	   will	   thus	   issue	   money	   only	   when	   it	   is	   wanted	   for	   actual	  business	  purposes.	  The	  new	  money	  presents	  no	  risk	  of	  inflation	  because	  the	  bank’s	  assets	  automatically	   rise	   in	   step	  with	   its	   issuance	  of	  money.	  When	  business	   slows	  and	  less	  money	  is	  needed,	  unwanted	  bank	  notes	  will	  reflux	  to	  the	  banks,	  possibly	  as	  loan	   repayments	   or	   for	   the	   purchase	   of	   securities	   held	   by	   the	   banks.	   Notice	   that	  unwanted	   reflux	   of	   money	   would	   subject	   bankers	   to	   the	   relatively	   minor	  inconvenience	   of	   having	   excess	   bank	   notes	   pile	   up	   in	   vaults,	   whereas	   failure	   to	  provide	  market	  liquidity	  when	  it	  is	  wanted	  can	  be,	  and	  often	  has	  been,	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  recession.	  	  
Money	  Shortages	  and	  Money	  Surpluses	  	  Shortages	   of	   money,	   and	   the	   resulting	   recessions,	   have	   been	   noted	   by	   nearly	   all	  observers	  of	  monetary	  history.	  The	  problem	  was	  especially	  easy	   to	  see	  during	   the	  American	  Colonial	  period,	  which	  provided	  a	  convenient	  laboratory	  for	  the	  study	  of	  money:	  	  
There is such a general scarcity of cash that nothing we 
have will command it,” New Jersey resident James Parker 
explained in November (1765)… country stores were “all 
shutt up,” the proprietors “either broke or obliged to 
decline that Business from a Real Inability to carry on… 
”and the distress of the people was very great from an 
amazing scarcity of money”. (Ernst, 1973, p. 247-248) 
 
The (Maryland) House of Delegates in 1702 declared that to 
raise money by taxing the people “is utterly impracticable 
here for there’s several hundred families, nay the greatest 
part of the whole province, have not five shillings by them 
or any means to raise it because there is very little 
amongst us.” And in 1706 an official statement avowed that 
the province “is wholly destitute of any manner of coin for 
which we labor under the greatest difficulty. (Nettels, 
1934, p. 206.)	  	  When	   the	   quantity	   of	   money	   is	   too	   small	   for	   people	   to	   conduct	   their	   business	  conveniently,	  a	  recession	  will	  result.	  By	  extension,	  a	  recession	  that	  was	  caused	  by	  a	  money	  shortage	  will	  be	  relieved	  by	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  money	  supply.	  	  	  
In the year 1722-3, the Governor and Assembly… thought 
themselves obliged to take into their serious Consideration 
the distressed Circumstances and Sufferings of the People, 
through the extreme Want of some Kind of Currency…These 
Bills being emitted, their Effect very sensibly appeared, 
in giving new Life to Business, and raising the Country in 
some measure, from its languishing state. (Pennsylvania 
Assembly to the Board of Trade, 1726. Cited in Brock, 1941, 
p. 76) 
	  But	   once	   the	  money	   supply	   is	   big	   enough	   to	   accommodate	   the	   needs	   of	   business,	  further	  issues	  of	  money	  will	  not	  have	  any	  stimulative	  effect	  on	  production,	  and	  the	  excess	  money	  will	  either	  pile	  up	  in	  vaults	  or	  reflux	  to	  its	  issuers.	  Quantity	  theorists	  normally	   assert	   that	   if	   such	   a	   monetary	   expansion	   were	   carried	   too	   far,	   then	  inflation	  would	  result.	  The	  real	  bills	  view	  denies	  this,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  as	  long	  as	  each	  new	  dollar	  is	  issued	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  dollar’s	  worth	  of	  assets,	  then	  the	  money-­‐issuer’s	   assets	  will	  move	   in	   step	  with	   the	   quantity	   of	  money	   and	  no	   inflation	  will	  result.	  	  	  A	   bank	   that	   issues	   its	   notes	   in	   exchange	   for	   real	   bills	   can	   be	   confident	   that	   the	  quantity	  of	  its	  bank	  notes	  will	  be	  neither	  too	  large	  nor	  too	  small.	  But	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  ill	  effects	  of	  too	  little	  money	  (i.e.,	  a	  recession)	  are	  far	  stronger	  than	  the	  ill	  effects	  of	  too	  much	  money	  (i.e.,	  unwanted	  reflux).	  This	  raises	  a	  question:	  Why	  should	  banks	  take	   any	   steps	   at	   all	   to	   limit	   the	   quantity	   of	   money	   they	   issue?	   Why	   not	   follow	  Fullarton’s	  advice	  and	   issue	  as	  many	  notes	  as	   the	  public	  will	  receive	   from	  it?	  Why	  issue	   new	   money	   only	   in	   exchange	   for	   real	   bills?	   Why	   not	   issue	   new	   money	   in	  exchange	  for	  assets	  of	  any	  kind,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  of	  adequate	  value?	  	  	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  the	  printing	  and	  handling	  costs	  of	  bank	  notes	  can	  sometimes	  be	  significant	  to	  the	  issuing	  bank,	  and	  those	  costs	  could	  easily	  matter	  more	  to	  the	  bank	  than	  the	  social	  risks	  of	  issuing	  too	  little	  money.	  	  Old-­‐time	  note-­‐issuing	  bankers	  often	  complained	   of	   the	   expense	   of	   issuing	   bank	   notes	   on	   Monday,	   only	   to	   have	   them	  reflux	   to	   the	   bank	   on	   Tuesday.	   It	   is	   therefore	   understandable	   that	   note-­‐issuing	  banks	  would	  develop	  a	  rule	  that	  would	  place	  an	  upper	  limit	  on	  their	  own	  note-­‐issue,	  and	  experience	   taught	   those	  bankers	   that	   this	  upper	   limit	  was	  best	  maintained	  by	  banks’	  restricting	  their	  discounting	  to	  real	  bills.	  	  If	   some	   new	   form	   of	   money	   had	   negligible	   handling	   costs,	   then	   bankers	   might	  happily	   issue	   huge	   amounts	   of	  money,	   and	  never	   run	   the	   risk	   of	   issuing	   too	   little	  money.	  Bankers	  could	   then	   issue	   their	  money	   in	  exchange	   for	  any	  valuable	  assets,	  not	  just	  real	  bills.	  This	  was	  not	  practicable	  for	  old-­‐time	  note-­‐issuing	  bankers,	  and	  so	  they	   found	   it	   best	   to	   issue	  money	   only	   in	   exchange	   for	   real	   bills.	   Modern	   banks,	  especially	  central	  banks,	  are	  much	  closer	  to	  the	  ideal	  of	  being	  able	  to	  issue	  moneys	  with	   negligible	   handling	   costs.	   This	  means	   that	   instead	   of	   insisting	   on	   short-­‐term	  
real	  bills	  of	  adequate	  value,	  banks	  might	  be	  open	  to	  issuing	  money	  in	  exchange	  for	  
any	   short-­‐term	   assets	   of	   adequate	   value.	   This	   revised	   version	   of	   the	   real	   bills	  doctrine	  would	  give	  banks	  the	  freedom	  to	  risk	  the	  negligible	  cost	  of	  issuing	  too	  much	  money,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  they	  would	  never	  run	  the	  colossal	  risk	  of	  issuing	  too	  
little	  money. 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Example 
 
Figure 1 shows an example of the real bills view of a note-issuing bank. 
 
Figure 1 
 
      Assets     Liabilities 
1)  100 ounces of silver deposited  $100 of bank notes issued 
2)  $200 of 60-day real bills acquired  $200 of bank notes issued 
 
In line (1), the bank (which may be a central bank or a private bank) receives 100 ounces 
of silver on deposit, issuing $100 of bank notes in exchange. Each dollar note is initially 
convertible at the bank into 1 ounce of silver. In order to be in strict compliance with the 
real bills doctrine, the $100 of notes should have been issued in exchange for short-term 
real bills of adequate value. The silver qualifies as a short-term asset and it is of adequate 
value, but it is not a real bill. Historically, bankers found that notes issued for real bills 
tended to stay in circulation, whereas notes issued for metal tended to reflux prematurely, 
(Tooke, 1844, p. 56.) but in this case we will suppose that the bank is in need of silver 
reserves in order to meet the occasional demands of its customers, so the real bills 
doctrine can be relaxed somewhat. It might also be the case that the market was cash-
starved before the notes were issued, so the notes would stay in circulation whether or not 
the new bank notes were issued in exchange for real bills. 
 
In line (2) the bank issues another $200 in exchange for $200 worth of 60-day real bills, 
thus following the real bills doctrine to the letter. The real bills view is that even though 
the bank tripled the money supply, it also tripled the assets backing that money, so the 
value of the dollar is unaffected. If this monetary expansion did cause the dollar to lose 
value, then arbitragers would buy dollars in the open market for (say) 0.99 ounces, then 
present those dollars to the bank and receive 1.00 ounces. Note that if the bank were to be 
liquidated, it could sell its $200 of real bills in exchange for $200 of its own bank notes 
(which it would retire), and then use its 100 ounces of silver to buy back the remaining 
$100 of its bank notes. At no point would the dollar drop below 1 ounce in value.  
 
Seeing that a large increase in the money supply has no effect on the value of the dollar, 
quantity theorists would normally conclude that prices are sticky (Ball & Mankiw, 1994). 
The real bills view is that it is not that prices are sticky, it is that an adequately-backed 
increase in the money supply has no tendency to raise prices. Quantity theorists would go 
on to claim that the combination of more money and unchanged prices leads to a 
temporary stimulus to trade and production. The real bills view, in contrast, asserts that if 
that new money were issued in a cash-starved economy, then trade and production would 
be stimulated by the improvement in liquidity. 
 
Quantity theorists often claim that metallic convertibility provides an automatic check 
against inflation, but that this check on inflation is lost when bank notes are inconvertible 
(Ashton & Sayers, 1953, p. 25). In refutation of this, the real bills doctrine argues that the 
value of money is determined in the same way as stocks, bonds, options, and other 
financial securities: not by metallic convertibility, but by asset backing. For example, 
suppose the quantity of money the public wants to hold routinely fluctuates between $100 
and $300. The bank could accommodate these fluctuations entirely by buying and selling 
its bonds, never paying out or taking in silver. This means that a bank could suspend 
silver convertibility for an indefinite period without ever causing the value of the dollar to 
deviate from $1=1 ounce, as long as the bank holds 1 ounce worth of assets for every 
dollar issued. 
 
Figure 2 
 
      Assets     Liabilities 
1)  100 ounces of silver deposited  $100 of bank notes issued 
2)  $200 of 60-day real bills acquired  $200 of bank notes issued 
 
3)  -30 ounces of silver (stolen)  -30 ounces net worth  
 
Figure 2 duplicates figure 1, but then considers what would happen if the bank were 
robbed of 30 ounces of silver (line 3).  The 30-ounce loss constitutes 10% of the bank’s 
assets, so one might expect it to cause a 10% fall in the value of the bank’s dollar notes, 
but the loss of value is exaggerated by a feedback effect: The bank’s $200 of real bills is 
denominated in dollars, so a loss in the value of the dollar would cause the bank’s bills to 
lose value, which results in less backing for the bank’s dollars, a further fall in the value 
of the dollar, and so on.  
 
Define E as the value of the dollar (ounces/$). Setting Assets=Liabilities yields 
 
100+170E=300E 
 
or E=0.77 ounces/$ 
 
The result of this inflationary feedback is that the bank’s 10% loss of assets caused a 23% 
drop in the value of the dollar. It is clear that if the bank held less silver (a real asset) and 
more bills (a nominal asset, since it is denominated in dollars), then a loss of assets would 
cause more inflation. Unfortunately, central banks typically hold mostly nominal assets. 
The Mexican central bank, for example, holds mostly Mexican government bonds, which 
are denominated in the same pesos that the bank itself issues. The above analysis implies 
that the Mexican central bank could stabilize the peso by selling its peso-denominated 
bonds for dollar-denominated bonds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
      Assets     Liabilities 
1)  100 ounces of silver deposited  $100 of bank notes issued 
2)  $200 of 60-day real bills acquired  $200 of bank notes issued 
3)  -30 ounces of silver (stolen)  -30 ounces net worth  
 
4) +bonds worth 69 ounces   +$89.70 bank notes issued 
 
Figure 3 duplicates Figure 2, and shows the bank restoring the real cash balances that the 
public lost because of the theft in line 3. 
 
Immediately after the theft, the public is left holding $300 of bank notes that are worth 
0.77 ounces each, so real cash balances held by the public total to 231 ounces (=300 x 
0.77).  Presumably, desired real cash balances were 300 ounces, so the money shortage of 
69 ounces must be corrected by issuing an additional $89.70 of new bank notes and using 
them to conduct an open market purchase of bonds worth 69 ounces. Note that in this 
example the change in the value of the dollar precedes the change in the quantity of 
money. This is consistent with the observations of real-bills sympathizers from Thomas 
Tooke (1844, p. 172) to Thomas Sargent (1982, p. 89). 
 
Returning to line 4, suppose we allow politics to intrude on our imaginary bank. The 69-
ounce money shortage will cause a recession, and those who feel the money shortage 
most directly will demand that more money be issued. These demands for more money 
will be opposed by “tight money” partisans: 
 
“The inflationist or expansionist doctrine is presented in 
several varieties. But its essential content remains always 
the same. 
 
The oldest and most naïve version is that of the allegedly 
insufficient supply of money. Business is bad, says the 
grocer, because my customers or prospective customers do 
not have enough money to expand their purchases. So far he 
is right. But when he adds that what is needed to render 
his business more prosperous is to increase the quantity of 
money in circulation, he is mistaken. What he really has in 
mind is an increase of the amount of money in the pockets 
of his customers and prospective customers while the amount 
of money in the hands of other people remains unchanged.” 
(Ludwig Von Mises. “The Theory Of Money And Credit.” P. 
752) 
 
Partisans of both tight money and easy money fail to see that newly-issued money will 
normally be backed by new assets, and will not cause inflation. This misunderstanding 
leaves both sides accusing the other of low motives. This perennial debate between tight-
money/easy-money views dates back at least three centuries. 
 
The retirement of a large proportion of the circulating 
medium through annual taxation, regularly produced a 
stringency from which the legislature sought relief through 
postponement of the retirements. If the bills were not 
called in according to the terms of the acts of issue, 
public faith in them would lessen, if called in there would 
be a disturbance of the currency. On these points there was 
a permanent disagreement between the governor and the 
representatives, discussions concerning which reveal 
themselves in 1715 and traces of which are frequently found 
after that date. (Davis, 1900, p. 21.) 
 
As economic controversies go, the tight-money/easy-money debate is surprisingly one-
sided, in favor of the easy-money view. As long as the easy-money faction asks only that 
new money be issued with adequate backing, then issuing that money will serve to 
correct any money shortage, and will stimulate trade, with no risk of inflation. The only 
drawback of an easy money policy is a possible unwanted reflux of currency, but even 
this is limited by the fact that banks will only issue new money to customers who want 
that money badly enough to offer assets of equal or greater value. From a real bills view, 
monetary policy should always be easy, and never tight. 
 
Tight-money factions, in contrast, have been driven by misunderstanding. On hearing 
demands for “more money”, tight money partisans answer that issuing 10% more money 
will only serve to raise prices by 10%. They fail to see that the additional money will be 
backed by additional assets, and will not cause inflation. Furthermore, they fail to see that 
the additional money can relieve an “allegedly insufficient supply of money”, and can 
revive a cash-starved economy.  
 
But the real bills view does not leave easy money partisans completely unscathed. J.M. 
Keynes’ famous advice to stimulate the economy by burying bank notes in dis-used coal 
mines, for example, runs afoul of the real bills doctrine, since the issuing banks would 
receive no new assets for the bank notes. Thus a 10% increase in the money supply 
would leave each unit of money with (at least) 10% less backing, and would cause 10% 
inflation without providing additional real liquidity to the public. If Keynes had instead 
recommended that new money be issued (in a presumably cash-starved economy) with 
adequate backing, then a 10% increase in the money supply would have caused no 
inflation, but would have increased real cash balances, and stimulated the economy by 
providing needed liquidity. 
 
Conclusion	  
 
When properly stated, the real bills doctrine allows a better understanding of money than 
does the quantity theory. The fundamental difference between the two theories is that the 
quantity theory asserts that the value of money will be maintained as long as the quantity 
of money does not outrun the production of goods, while the real bills doctrine asserts 
that the value of money will be maintained as long as the quantity of money does not 
outrun the assets of its issuer. Critics of the real bills doctrine (notably Thornton, 
Ricardo, and Mints) failed to understand this difference, with the result that their 
criticisms were invalid. 
 
In contrast to the quantity theory, the real bills doctrine implies (1) that central banks 
should not hold assets denominated in their own currencies, (2) that prices are not sticky, 
and in fact changes in the price level can often precede changes in the money supply, and 
(3) that convertibility is irrelevant to the value of money.  
 
The real bills doctrine overturns the usual view of the monetary “tightrope” between tight 
money and easy money policies. The real bills view of monetary policy could be 
summarized, without much exaggeration, as “never tight, always easy”. Never tight, 
because any refusal to issue a dollar to a customer who offers a dollar’s worth of assets in 
exchange, would restrict that customer’s liquidity, stifle trade, and contribute to a 
recession. Furthermore, that refusal would not tend to raise the value of the dollar, since 
any reduction in the quantity of dollars would normally be matched by an equal reduction 
in the assets of the issuing bank. 
 
The rationale for “always easy” is that as long as the issuing bank’s assets move in step 
with the quantity of money, no amount of money issue will cause inflation. Meanwhile, 
the fact that some customer is willing to offer the bank a dollar’s worth of assets for a 
newly-issued dollar, implies that that dollar is wanted in the circulation, and issuing that 
dollar would relieve a money shortage and stimulate trade. 
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